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Seeking to identify and compare relationships between party finance processes 
and political corruption poses many problems, and the basic assumption 
underlying this paper is that one way of illuminating them is to utilize a very 
broad canvas. At a time when much is made of time series data that encompass 
only a few years, it is well to try to understand how perceptions of corruption 
have varied in Europe and America since the initial appearance of modem mass 
parties. It is also good to utilize opportunities to align recent provocative 
developments in Europe with a sampling of non-Atlantic democratic political s 
systems. Mainly I will attempt to sketch a framework of analysis, and to suggest 
tentative interpretations of particular national or institutional placements and 
locations.
We can start by asking what kind of connection conventional political 
science wisdom at the turn of the 20lh century perceived between political party 
finance and political corruption, and where the two phenomena were most 
closely linked. The answer is that both Europeans and Americans felt that 
corruption was most highly nurtured through the patronage based party 
machines in America. Whereas writers like Michels discerned the emergence of 
party machines in German Social Democrat and similar parties, in America 
tendencies toward disciplined party organizations were then undermined by the 
progressive movement and the wave of legislation that it initiated.
Around 1900 the American reform coalition mounted a frontal attack 
against parties and their corporate allies, and was able to stop the party 
controlled flow of legislation. This occurred almost simultaneously with the 
creation of the “bastard in the party state” (Skowronek) as a consequence of the 
belated Civil Service reform. Consequently the initiation of political finance 
limits and publicity culminated a quarter century during which the American 
party system seemed about to be propelled into a trajectory following the 
British, but then spun off into a quite different direction with the diminution of 
the power of party leaders through the imposition of party primaries, and the 
reliance on publicity as a control mechanism.
It would be fruitful to project what European party theorists like 
Ostrogorski and Weber might have prognosticated around 1910 about how party
An earlier version of this text was presented at the Conference on Political Parties Finance 



























































































finance and political corruption would come to be linked. Max Weber 
acknowledged parties as vectors of the political system, but followed 
Ostrogorski’s critique in lamenting the persistence of public office patronage 
within the lower levels of American administration (Senigaglia, 179).
Weber’s insistence on sharply distinguishing between the roles of 
politicians and bureaucrats might have led him to accept the relative expansion 
of campaign fund raising by both parties and individual party candidates. He 
was more for strengthening the party organizations, but he also would have 
wanted to seek to avoid the alternative varieties of intermixing of party political 
and bureaucratic careers and domains which later came to be associated in 
varying degree with the party-state development in countries like France, 
Germany and Italy. Ostrogorski preferred the British model in part because of 
its lower corruption levels (Senigaglia, 164).
It was only after World War I that most European countries came to have 
fully developed mass parties based on unlimited adult suffrage. In America 
earlier Progressive legislation reducing the power of party hierarchies was 
followed by limitations on party finance practices which in 1925 were adopted 
as the Corrupt Practices Act. Thus the corruption labels of the Progressive 
period remained in use in inter-war America, in good part with regard to 
monitoring electoral practices. This was scarcely the case in the Continental 
European countries, where the banner of exposing politico-financial scandals 
was waved mainly by anti-democratic parties of the Right, as in the attacks on 
Matthias Erzberger in Weimar Germany. If today we scarcely find it possible to 
reconstruct objective indicators of corruption for this period it is in part because, 
from the democratic perspective, potentially corrupt behavior patterns came to 
be eclipsed by, or intertwined with, the widespread reliance on violence and 
intimidation in the struggle among mass parties of various types. As to 
corruption in non-Westem areas, can one imagine an anti-bribery treaty being 
placed on the agenda of the League of Nations?
With different accents the relative neglect of corruption as a major 
national political issue continued into the post-World War II period. The 
continuation of various kinds of economic and credit controls probably served to 
“fudge” tracers of corrupt practices, while in the United States the kind of 
parochial corruption committed by, for instance some officials of the Truman 
administration, was overshadowed by larger issues of the Cold War. Since 
cross-national secret transfers of funds was one of the ways in which the pro­
capitalist side aided European parties in the struggle against communism, it was 
not likely that their allied media in Europe or elsewhere would highlight illegal 
party finance practices as issues of political corruption. During the 1940’s and 




























































































contrasting to highlight just how funding of parties and candidates violated rules 
against the mixing of public and private interests. When observers wrote about 
the “Americanization “ of some European party systems, or when Kirchheimer 
wrote about the displacement of mass by catch-all parties, they usually did not 
strongly emphasize corrupt expenditures. The spin-off pattern that would 
catapult campaign costs, and diminish reliance on dues income from party 
members, was largely yet to come.
Although the American campaign legislation which introduced limits on 
campaign contributions and publicity requirements was characterized by “faulty 
conception and casual enforcement”, it was held to set standards in contrast with 
which the objectives of British legislation “were modest” (Heard, EB, 1959. 
549-50). The only other European corrupt practices legislation briefly 
mentioned by political scientists in the 1959 edition of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica was the French legislation of 1913/14 (Gosnell, ibid 124).
Although scarcely as well documented as some other phenomena from 
that decade, it was during the 1960's that social scientists began to examine both 
party finance and political corruption phenomena on a less nation-bound and 
parochial basis. At the start of that decade the basis for internationally 
comparative research was established through the creation of a committee on 
Party Finance and Political Corruption of the International Political Science 
Association. But the numerous scholars who came to pursue research presented 
to meetings of that body continued in a tradition of distinguishing rather sharply 
between, in the main, socially acceptable ways of financing political parties, and 
patterns of political corruption. Papers and books analyzed topics under one of 
the two categories, not both. For several decades there were virtually no 
attempts to simultaneously examine linkages between party finance processes 
and explicitly recognized patterns of political corruption. (Leibfried, Rhodes).
Attempts to develop definitions of corruption across language and cultural 
boundaries based on Anglophone definitions made some headway in the 
emerging literature but were not completely successful. If there are still today 
the strong differences in the prevailing national core notions of corruption, what 
are these due to? Since legal definitions often loom so large, do embedments in 
common law or code law traditions make considerable difference?
By itself, legality provides an inadequate criterion for cross-national 
comparison. For party finance practices provide a generally striking example of, 
“What is illegal in one country may not be in another, leading to situations in 
which similar acts may be defined as corrupt or not according to where they take 
place?” (Heywood, 1997, 7) Whether and by how much party campaign 




























































































not played a decisive role in the heated European discussion of linkages between 
party finance and political corruption which has occurred in the 1990’s.
From this vantage point one might seek to identify just which group of 
developed countries have hosted the revelations and recognitions that have 
giving rise to alternative perspectives from the conventional ones mainly 
developed in the Anglophone literature? It seems that new relationships between 
the judiciary and the media are in process of crystallizing some new 
perspectives in countries like France and Spain, which have inherited certain 
elite privileges in prefecturally based bureaucratic systems. It is probably not 
accidental that some of the party leaders who have been found guilty of 
corruption have been big city mayors and others who have benefited from dual 
or triple mandates, which have shored up their party positions.
For theoretical perspectives that would help generalize about the party 
finance/corruption problem, a more likely set of countries are the trio of 
Germany, Italy and Japan. While the latter two have been often been discussed 
in tandem because their party systems both unraveled due to corruption 
revelations during the 1990’s, there have been fewer attempts to analyze why 
Germany party system was less drastically affected.
Apart from their heritage of renewing democratic traditions under post- 
1945 occupation tutelage, the emergent political systems of these three countries 
subsequently had in common long periods of dominance by conservative 
parties. Their electoral systems encouraged varying degrees of factionalism, and 
these countries also exhibited considerable differences with regard to their party 
laws, tendencies toward effective inter-party competition , public financing of 
parties and campaign use of private media, and the monitoring role of public 
prosecutors and especially their constitutional courts.
These factors conditioned the degree to which party financing activities 
within the three party systems led to the incidence of extensive political 
corruption cases. Corruption here is u conceptualized under the “abuse of public 
office for private profit” definition, not under the less restrictive “abuse of 
public office for party advantage” definition.1
Significant for the developments were the different occupation period lags 
before party politicians in national parliament held significant decision making 
power. This occurred earlier in Japan, where large scale corruption scandals 
erupted at a time when German politicians presided over only limited power in 
Land governments. Election laws adopted in Japan and Italy permitted or even 
encouraged organized intra-party factions. The delayed West German 




























































































monitor their party followers. The concern of business leaders not to allow 
flagrant corruption cases to enflame anti-capitalist sentiments, led in all three 
countries cases to the evolution of mechanisms through which political 
contributions were tunneled through associational channels. But due to the early 
German implementation of both the parties law and an effective constitutional 
court, the subsequent German development was distinctive because of the 
immense amounts of litigation and legislative energies that came to be devoted 
to monitoring the boundary between legitimate party financing and illegitimate 
corrupt and political exchanges.'
In contrast to Italy whose 1974 Parties Law seems never tested for 
constitutionality by its highest court, and to Japan which long did not have one. 
the German party law and related legislation were subject to intensive and 
repeated scrutiny by the Constitutional Court (BVG) from the 1950’s to date. As 
West Germany became the European pacesetter in public party subsidies, the 
repercussions of alternative subsidy formulas on the equality of chances of both 
citizens and parties were examined by successive generations of judges with 
excruciating dexterity. Hordes of party law specialists became adroit in the 
ritualistic dance steps which came to constitute a republican substitute for the 
ballet performances that had once graced the Archducal palace in Karlsruhe. It 
was in the context of such a highly refined network of rule-making, rule-testing 
and rule-adaptation that the charges of high level corruption involved in the 
Flick scandal exploded in the 1980’s. What the handling of this case showed 
about t he prevalence and punishment of political corruption has remained in 
sharp dispute.
Did the court in its 1989 decision increasing (in effect) the permissible 
monetary limits of party donations, legalize activities which had been 
potentially criminal, and lead to actively exculpate those politicians whom the 
media had found guilty of trading ministerial decisions for party donations? This 
complex snapshot may capture how the court set a moving stage in front of 
which German audiences were enabled to judge whether their leading party 
politicians had transgressed, according to intuitive perception the boundaries 
delineating between the zones of white, gray and black corruption.
When in the early 1960’s public financing of parties was first discussed as 
an alternative to the reliance on associational funding from business, the 
President of the German Industrial Federation, Berg, angrily told a journalist 
that he would be quit happy if all parties were financed by the state, because 
“then we in industry can save a lot of money, for we could then go out and 
simply buy the number of deputies which we require.” ( 
Heidenheimer/Langdon) Twenty years later the Flick case achieved notoriety 




























































































ministers, with plausible links to tax policy outcomes directly benefiting the 
firm. The transactions were potentially illegal, because ministers were subject to 
the same rules as the civil servants, and not those of parliamentarians.
Writing much later, a sociologist judged that the financing pattern which 
Berg defended allows the establishment of clientelistic relationships between 
donors and politicians and lends itself the out right bribery” (Blankenburg 1989, 
PC, 115). But in 1985, all members of the BVG Senate which heard the Flick 
case, and all except one member the Bundestag committee which examined the 
charges subsequently, agreed that the donations did not fall afoul of the legal 
rules relating to either the bribery or the corruption criterion. The only dissident 
was a Green Party committee member named Otto Schily (now in office as 
Minister of Interior) who in a dissenting opinion said it constituted a clear case 
of political corruption3.
When the Italian public was confronted in 1993 by the Milan revelations 
which triggered the mani puliti investigations, it had not had the benefit of such 
prolonged tutoring in the legal conditionality of political exchange relationships. 
They had been alerted through the 1988 CENSIS study that widely prevalent 
administrative corruption of 136 trillion Lira a year (Landfried, 244). The 
contract kickbacks involved went partly to private pockets, but largely into party 
treasuries. The greater need for these was partly due to the fact that whereas 
public subsidies were covering an increasing share of German party 
expenditures, the equivalent ratio was decreasing in the Italian case.4 (Landfried, 
116) Thus the illegal contributions from public and other companies were 
estimated to have totaled as much as the public subsidies,and later on, several 
times as much as these. (Bardi/Morlino, 260)
Most unique in the Italian use of corruptly gained funds , in European 
comparison, was the way in which these were used to buy membership cards by 
the various party factions, Thus the subtlety of clientelistic networks was 
accompanied by the apparently crude purchase of intra-party power (Dellaporta 
and Vannucci, 118-9), in ways that surely were not paralleled in the German or 
other north-European cases, where centralized party leadership generally was 
able to force factions to sublimate their conflicts. Within the PS1 by contrast, 
truppe cammellate were mobilized by falanges of competing factions. (Rhodes, 
71) If all was fair in love and war, then it seems easier to intuit why ethical 
imperatives were so much easier to evade in everyday Italian political life.
For those who employ a broad corruption definition, the breaching of 
legal limits of who could give how much to political parties, made the bulk of 
these illegal contributions subject to being counted toward corruption totals. In 




























































































seems so regarded not as the result of proven quid-pro-quo patterns, but mainly 
as the consequence of violations of political funding rules and limits had been 
adopted as part of political finance reform legislation, such as those of the 
1970's.
Where locus of the German debate differed was that in the later period the 
debate about the legality of various practices centered in a more crucial way on 
the question of whether the funding practices violated the “Equality principle" 
which guaranteed citizens equal voice in political decision-making. Attempts to 
make similar grounds prevail in the American debate were stymied by the 
Supreme Court’s Buckley v Valleo decision of 1976, which gave the First 
Amendment guaranteed rights of free speech priority over the weighting of 
wealthier voters through their donations. In the aftermath of the Flick case, the 
BVG was also accused of weakening its equality stand by accepting higher 
donor limits. Subsequently it seems to have tried to correct this by the 1992 
decision in which it required a lower donation limit and outlawed tax 
deductibility of corporate contributions (but also did away with the special 
equalization fund, which proved quixotic in implementation).
European Party Corruption Links of the 1990s
From the late 1980’s the classification of which relations between business, 
public enterprises and parties that could be considered corrupt underwent 
widespread change in Europe. In some ways the heightened critical perspective 
was reminiscent of what had occurred in the US during the progressive period 
around 1910. Lacking genuine Europe-wide media, there were however national 
differences to whether the presumptions of corruption were originated by 
academic or judicial public interest groups or authors, and also in whether and 
how the corruption focus was emphasized.
Others can testify as to how much the Italian revelations originating in 
Milan had played a key role in triggering initiatives like the Geneva Appeal, 
which sought to encourage prosecutors and magistrates in the Latin countries to 
persevere more rigorously against political constraints on the scope of their 
investigation, thus taking a leaf from the successes of their Italian colleagues.
In Germany the investigatory thrust of the 1990’s turned up more cases of 
mundane, apolitical bureaucratic corruption at the municipal level. Another 
German media theme of party abuse of public office turned the focus more on 
allegedly excessive parliamentary salary perquisites, which however were 




























































































there were differences among groups of social scientists as to who should lead 
the public attacks on bastions of corruption and special privilege .
National Party Finance and Corruption Rankings
Among the early comparative party finance publications was the series of 
articles published in the Journal o f Politics in 1963 which included articles on 
party finance in eight countries. There was also summary article, “Notes On 
Practices and Towards a Theory," in which I developed indexes of campaign 
expenditures for nine countries, mainly those covered in articles in that issue. 
The best estimates of campaign year party expenditures were translated into how 
much per-capita costs were equivalent to in terms of the hourly wage income of 
an industrial worker. The index numbers varied from forty minutes to more than 
twenty hours.
Recently, I revisited that data in context of recent efforts toward 
comparing countries on their corruption incidence. These have produced the 
rankings that Johan Graf Lambsdorff and TI have developed on the basis of 
world wide rankings of corruption incidence by business men and other 
observers collected by business information services.
To my astonishment I did find a consistent relationship between the two 
quite different rankings, based on observations made 35 years apart. With two 
exceptions, those of India and Israel, the rank order of the countries on the two 
very different scales are similar and symmetrical. Why do seven of the nine 
cases show such a strong linear fit, given that most of the corruption perception 
ratings are of behavior of bureaucrats who are probably extracting bribes for 
their personal use, rather than passing funds on to parties?6
An initial thesis for how the relationship is demonstrated over time, would 
postulate that the parties’ need for money leads to institutionalized ways of 
favor trading, which encourages or condones corrupt exchanges even in arenas 
relatively remote from partisan campaign politics. Party finance may not rely 
predominantly on quid-pro quo contributions, but to the extent that some are 
included, they may symbolize societal toleration of exploiting public offices for 
individual private benefit. There are surely other contributing explanations, 
which might perhaps be explored via survey research methods.
Looking at the two extreme cases in the graph, one can explain the 
contrasts between Australia and the Philippines as polar examples of the 
intensity and efficacy of monitoring and prosecution of potential corrupt 




























































































tendencies of candidate centered politics of the American and Latin types. 
Clientelistic politics predominate in appeals to a geo-politically heterogeneous 
electorate which has inhibited the formation of mass parties. Australia by 
contrast inherited the world’s first electorally successful working-class mass 
party in a political culture where ‘mateship’ ideology probably facilitated 
various forms of favoritism. Australian states have, in recent decades 
implemented relatively massive anti-corruption control programs, like the New 
South Wales Independent Commission against Corruption, whose efficacy in 
mobilizing taboos against even marginal favor giving by civil servants may have 
helped to produce the favorable Australian rating achieved in the corruption 
perception indexes.
We may also speculate about why we find Japan along the regression line 
with a placement higher than the US, but so much lower than Italy? It seems that 
we may partly attribute the lower U.S. ranking to the fact that whereas American 
party factions compete with each other, they do not do so in the general 
elections within the same electoral districts, as was the case in the other two 
countries. In turn the Italian corruption perception index was probably higher 
than the Japanese because of the way in which sectors of the public 
administration were colonized by particular parties to a degree not so apparent 
in Japan.
The much greater vulnerability to corruption charges of Italian parties may 
be attributed to lesser efficacy of legal and institutional controls over practices 
by cartel parties. Lacking the kinds of built-in class and religious-based moral 
monitoring found more efficacious in North Europe, Italian society was unable 
to keep dominant clientelistic relations from infiltrating both the party and 
bureaucratic components. The resultant partial fusion of the two sectors 
distinguished it from Japan, where larger parts of the national bureaucracy were 
long able to keep somewhat aloof from the contract kickbacks and similar 
corrupt practices. To the extent that some were indiscreet in gift-taking 
practices, the bureaucrats have more recently also had to accept their share of 
opprobrium.
India and Israel. To explain the outlier status of these two countries, we 
can begin by noting that they became generally distinguished during most of the 
period since the 1960’s, by inclusion into their systems of many new ethnic 
groups, and their political parties. These were able to wrest national political 
supremacy from previously dominant parties which had earlier perpetuated more 





























































































By the 1990’s, after two generations of achieving independence from 
British control, it is evident that the two countries excelled in setting different 
kinds of world records: Israel for party and campaign expenditures, and India 
for the reputation having a most thoroughly corrupt democratic regime.
The record which Israel posted in the 1990’s with regard to party and 
campaign expenditures, are partly as a result of public subsidies which are the 
highest in the world, and three times those of Germany on a per-capita basis. 
Campaign expenditures reached a total of $20 per capita in the 1992 national 
elections. “While the influence of big money was severely limited in inter-party 
competition, new avenues of corruption were opened in internal party 
primaries”, (Hoffnung, 146) leading to per-capita party spending of $38, in the 
municipal elections of 1993.
Whereas corruption charges contributed to erosion of the Labor party’s 
dominance in Israel in the 1970’s, the much more dramatic Indian development 
has led to the conclusion that “the Neruvian State” itself “institutionalized 
corruption.” Subsequent grace and favor from government leaders led to 
pervasive corruption at all levels of government. In Congress’s 1989 campaign, 
a poster showed Rajiv Ghandi as Pinocchio with a nose resembling a long 
Bofors gun (Singh 213-218), an allusion to the huge bribe paid by the Swedish 
arms manufacturer to the Ghandi family.
If one asks what inhibited massive corruption in Israel, part of the answer 
may be that economic position of the poorer Israeli immigrants was 
considerably above that of the Indian masses, where “the corruption of the poor 
and their leaders is a necessary strategy of their survival” (Singh 219). In Israel 
extensive courting of the newer electorates was largely made feasible by public 
party subsidies, and experiences there were linked to a renewed trend towards 
“catch all” parties and meant to demonstrate that “cartel party formation can be 
arrested or even reversed” (Mendilow 270).
Toward Some Concluding Theses
Although I really lack data and techniques too fully demonstrate it, the above 
data and interpretation would seem to sustain the thesis that the strongly positive 
correlation between campaign expenditures and corruption along the Australia -  
Philippines axis is the predominant pattern. Given the temporal lag between the 
two data sets, one can conclude, at a minimum, that the implication that 



























































































An India-lsrael Axis? Should the three countries of India, Italy and Israel 
also be treated as a potential axis? The question is worth pondering. But it may 
be that Israel is unique in having to be analyzed in exogenous terms that go 
beyond the characteristics of the national party systems or even the national 
political systems. This uniqueness can be attributed partly to the predominance 
of the military, and the security for which only it can vouch. This would go far 
to explain why among all its scandals, Israel never suffered the equivalent of a 
Bofors or Lockheed affair. Whereas the security concern was regionally 
focused, the related economic goal of becoming a center of technological 
innovation, evolved within a global context. Thus the drive to make Israel 
second only to California as a center of advanced technical innovation put a 
much greater premium on the suppression of corruption tendencies in defense 
and other technology contracts. So are Israel as well as India may be both 
exceptional cases, which just happen to align with Italy in this curious way?
Cartel Partisan Corruption: Ostrogorski might be delighted to hear that 
critics of the emergence of so called cartel parties declare themselves as 
continuing his wariness about the evolution from party government to “the party 
state”. Ideological statements such as those alluding to an “invasion of the state 
by the parties” (Mair, Katz) seem to follow in his footsteps, and those of some 
earlier American Progressives. These recent hard-nosed European academic 
analyses seem to have emerged especially in the wake of the implosion of the 
Italian party system in the early 1990’s. Will the way that social scientists from 
other countries have shared in the fascination with the Italian case lead them to 
become more like some groups of party politicians in having their respective 
‘Toskana Fraktion’?
But how well do other European parties in cartel party systems sustain a 
more generalized thesis? Some aspects of the Flick case can be used to argue 
that the German development supported such a thesis for while such a thesis, but 
other consequences of the Constitutional court’s interpretation of the Parties law 
can be used to sustain the case of supporting continued competition If the 
Scandinavian party systems are perceived as strong examples of cartelized party 
systems, then their relative lack of corruption incidence would impede the 
development of a causal thesis. But how many Denmark’s does it take to 
counterbalance one Italy?
Religion and Size: Within Western Europe the strongest contrast in 
corruption correlation that seems to emerge from the Lambsdorff data is the one 
between the high corruption rankings of the large, predominantly Catholic 
countries, and the low rankings of small, predominantly Protestant ones. In. the 
northern countries both the religious influence on rights and duties of 




























































































to more effective monitoring. Banfield would hardly have found a Montegrano 
in Finland or Norway; t here patronage and clientelist relationships had been 
largely transmuted. But our interest in capturing these differences at the levels 
of parties is impeded by the fact that in most relevant countries the previously 
distinct Catholic and Protestant parties have generally been fused into inter­
denominational Christian Democratic parties.
A Rent by any Other Name: A concluding thesis might consider what Max 
Weber would have to say about the surprisingly ambiguous role that the current 
American party system is playing in the comparative discussion. What would he 
make for instance of a recent New York Times' editorial which bemoaned that 
“It took nearly 75 years for the United States to enact laws protecting elections 
from the corrupting influence of campaign contributions. But it has taken only 
four years to eviscerate those reforms” (NYT, 10 October 1998). Since 
American lawyers and judges had helped unravel the most recent attempts at 
legislative party finance regulation, whence would he think the best advice 
might be solicited -  from the Germans, the British, or maybe the Danes?
Gentlemen, he might reply, 1 would like nothing better to help the leading 
power of western capitalism to find an effective way of coping with the “soft 
money” problem as we enter the new millennium. But while some of the ill- 
effects of American profligacy have not been borne out in just the way I 
anticipated when I visited the St. Louis World’s Fair in 1905 I doubt whether 
any Europeans can offer good advice from their experiences. It seems to me that 
the low efficiency of the U.S. legislative-judicial machinery, can be largely 
attributed first, to the U.S. persisting in leading the world in the over-production 
of lawyers, and secondly, to its inability to create a system of responsible 
parties, as its wise elders had prescribed at mid-century; and thirdly, to its 
unique undermining of the distinctions between public and private spheres that 
is so crucial for the identification and suppression of corruption. As one of your 
pundits might put it: When Lincoln’s bedroom is for rent to the highest bidder, 
who can expect rent control to be effective in any part of the political sector?
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1 See Heidenheimer. Johnston. LeVine, eds. Political Corruption: A Handbook. 1989: 4-6.
2 A sketch of major developments: Indirect subventions/ court 1954, ordered replaced 1958; 
Direct subsidies introduced 1959, declared invalid 1966; Election reimbursements 1967, 
coupled with the tight limits: 1989 -1989 tax deductibility limits raised to DM120,000; 1992 
-  invalidation of high deductible limits as well as of a equalizing formula. (Poguntke 192- 
193).
1 By means of donations the Flick corporation has systematically gained spheres of influence, 
so that it must be stated the political corruption on a large scale is involved, regardless of 
whether the punishable act of bribery or corruptibility has been realized in one case or 
another. By means of the conspiratorial money distributed by the Flick Corporation, the 
benefiting parties gained a remarkable financial advantage compared to their political 
competitors.
4 German subsidies increased from about one-third to about 45% over the 1974-87 period 
while the Italian share decreased from 55-60% to the 40-45% range. (Landfried, 117).
5 In both Germany and the United States numerous academic specialists on party systems and 
party finance were accused of excessive tolerance of the status quo. Those attacked were 
often political scientists, while the critics came more from among scholars with legal 
credentials and administrative experience. Given the broader tradition of American pre­
occupation with corruption, the US has also begun to generate some academics who have 
specialized in identifying the high cost of corruption control measures in terms of the wastage 
of administrative resources.
6 Party Campaign Expenditures and Corruption Incidences





United Kingdom 0.64 8.41
Germany 0.95 8.21
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